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Abstract
Both the law and culture distinguish between acts of commission that overturn the status
quo and acts of omission that uphold it. This distinction is of central importance when it
comes to reciprocal actions. A stylized fact of everyday life is that acts of commission elicit
stronger reciprocal responses than do acts of omission. We report experiments that directly
test whether this stylized fact characterizes behavior in controlled experiments. We
compare reciprocal responses to both types of acts in experiments using binary, extensive
form games. Across three experiments, we examine the robustness of our results to
different ways in which the status quo can be induced in experiments. The data show a
clear difference between effects of acts of commission and omission by first movers on
reciprocal responses by second movers.

*Corresponding author. Email: jccox@gsu.edu.
Tel: + (404) 413-0200. Fax: (404) 413-0195.
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1. Introduction
Does it make a difference whether a bad or good outcome results from an act of commission
or an act of omission by another person?1 In this paper we compare reciprocal responses
to acts of commission, that actively impose harm or kindness, and acts of omission which
represent failures to prevent harm or to act kindly. We use three experiments to test a
hypothesis that acts of commission induce stronger reciprocal responses than comparable
acts of omission.
Each experiment has two treatments in which we compare the behavior in two
games that vary in their initial endowments, which creates the distinction between the first
mover’s acts of commission that alter the initial endowments and acts of omission that keep
them unaltered. Importantly, we keep the terminal payoffs in both games identical. This
gives us a clean test of the empirical significance of opportunities and payoffs that result
from acts of commission that change the status quo versus acts of omission that preserve
it.
To investigate reciprocal preferences, we focus on what happens after a first mover
chooses to uphold or overturn the status quo, that is, what is the reaction of another person
to this choice. Data from the experiment provide support for the importance of
discriminating between acts of commission and omission by a first mover in theoretical
modeling of reciprocal behavior.
2. Relationship to the Literature
We complement several established streams of literature. The work of psychologists has
focused on the omission bias which occurs when individuals judge harmful commissions,
such as igniting a fire, as worse than the corresponding harmful omissions, such as failing
to extinguish or report a fire. Spranca, Minsk, and Baron (1991), in a series of hypothetical
payoff experiments employing multiple decision scenarios, find that subjects’ ratings are
associated with judgments that omissions do not cause outcomes.
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For example, a waiter may be rewarded with an extremely large tip for going out of his way to serve a
customer but might not be punished with a small tip for choosing not to fulfill an extraordinary request.
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One of the proposed explanations for the omission bias is loss aversion (Tversky
and Kahneman, 1992) and the closely related phenomenon of status quo bias (see e.g.,
Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988; Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1990). If the status
quo is perceived as a reference point then individuals might be motivated to maintain the
status quo in order to avoid possible losses from overturning it. Baron and Ritov (1994)
explore this conjecture and argue that only part of the omission bias can be attributed to
loss aversion. In another study, Ritov and Baron (1995) examine the connection between
omission bias and anticipated regret. Because regret is triggered by relative disadvantages
resulting from actions rather than inactions, it imposes a natural psychological cost to acts
of commission.
The common feature of these psychology experiments is that they involve a single
decision maker whose choices do not affect others. Moreover, responses in these studies
do not have economic consequences. This stands in sharp contrast to our experiments in
which interactions between pairs of subjects have economic consequences for both
individuals.
A series of recent papers examine the omission bias in the context of decisions
affecting others and thus invoking social preferences. Hayashi (2013) finds that omission
bias tends to be “self-serving.” In his experiment, dictators who were randomly assigned
favorable endowments are less willing to reallocate money toward the recipient than when
the initial endowment was less favorable. In contrast, Gärtner and Sandberg (2014) find no
omission bias in their experiment and argue that much of this effect could be attributed to
preference for default options. Grossman (2014) studies decisions of dictators who could
choose to remain uninformed about the payoff consequences of their actions for the
matched recipients. He finds that subjects strongly respond to default options – i.e., whether
the default is set on revealing the recipient’s payoffs or keeping them hidden.
Our paper is concerned with reciprocal behavior, not dictator game behavior. And
we experiment with reciprocal behavior in a context in which there is no default option:
first movers must make choices, as must second movers.
While the economics literature recognizes intentions to be a driving factor for both
positive reciprocity (Cox, Sadiraj, and Sadiraj, 2008; Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher, 2008)
and negative reciprocity (Blount, 1995; Offerman, 2002), the typical experimental designs
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focus on the “proof of concept” that intentions matter, rather than on identifying conditions
under which the intent behind actions is revealed. The common element of such designs is
that they allow for the presence of intentions in one condition and remove their presence
in the control condition by either implementing the choice of the “first mover” exogenously
by the experimenter (e.g., Cox, 2004), using a randomizing device (e.g., Cox and Deck,
2005), or by forcing a particular choice through limiting the choice set to a singleton (e.g.,
McCabe, Rigdon, and Smith, 2003).
Bruni, Corazzini, and Stanca (2009) vary the nature of intentions via withholding
information that there is a second stage of the game from their subjects. Their experiment
employs a two-stage game in which a first mover chooses how much of his 20-token
endowment to send to a second mover. The amount sent is multiplied by 3 whereas the
amount kept remains unchanged. In the second stage, the second mover faces an identical
decision using his own endowment. When the first mover does not know that there is the
second stage, the motivation for his generosity is purely intrinsic. However, when the first
mover knows that the second mover can reciprocate his generous action, the first mover’s
motivation can be intrinsic or extrinsic. Bruni et al. find that the second movers respond to
possible motivation behind the first movers’ generosity and, consistently with the previous
literature, reward them more when extrinsic motives can be ruled out.
In a related study Brandts and Solà (2001) study the importance of perceived
intentions and distribution of outcomes. Their experiment consists of a series of miniultimatum games, in which the proposer has only two options. One of these options is held
fixed at (380, 80), while the other option systematically (i) increases/decreases the equality
of payoffs with respect to the fixed benchmark and (ii) varies whether the higher payoff
goes to the proposer or the recipient. The rejection rates for the fixed benchmark are the
lowest when the foregone option gave a lower payoff to the recipient than the benchmark
and the highest when the foregone option gave the recipient a higher payoff than to the
proposer and the payoffs were less asymmetric in terms of their equality than the fixed
benchmark. In contrast to Brandts and Solà, our experimental games differ in terms of the
status quo but keep the monetary payoffs at terminal nodes the same.
There are some previous papers that suggest the relevance of the distinction
between acts of commission and omission in reciprocal relationships. For instance, in the
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labor market relationship, a wage increase is reciprocated more strongly when it is an active
decision of the firm rather than a higher legal minimum wage (Charness, 2004). In the
Stackelberg mini-game (Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj, 2008), the Leader’s choice of quantity
is binary and the feasible set varies with treatment: 𝑞𝐿 = {6, 9} or 𝑞𝐿 = {9, 12}. After
learning about the Leader’s quantity decision, the Follower then chooses from the set 𝑞𝐹 =
{5, 6, … , 11}. By making a given output choice by the Leader be the smaller in one situation
(hence more generous to the Follower) and in another situation be the larger one (hence
less generous), this design allows for a joint test of effects of reciprocity and status quo but
does not separately identify the effects of acts of commission or omission.2
3. Experimental Design and Protocol
We first explain the abstract form of the game and, subsequently, explain alternative
economic implementations of the game. In what follows we use game trees to represent
the games, however it is important to note that in our experiments subjects were not shown
game trees. Subject instructions and response forms that show exactly how the games were
presented to the subjects are contained in electronic supplementary material.
3.1 Abstract Game Tree
All of our experimental treatments involve the game that can be represented by the tree
diagram in Figure 1a. In the ordered pairs of payoffs (a,b) at the terminal nodes, the number
a is the dollar payoff of Player A and the number b is the dollar payoff of Player B. Player
A chooses Left or Right at the top node. If Player A chooses Left then Player B has a
feasible set with two (ordered pairs of) payoffs, both of which favor Player A. If Player A
chooses Right then one of the two (ordered pairs of) payoffs is the equal split where each
player gets 10.
Player A may choose Left or Right based on her evaluation of the four alternative
ordered pairs of payoffs at the terminal nodes and her expectations about Player B’s
behavior. Player B may make his choice between Left or Right on each branch solely on
the basis of his evaluation of the payoffs on that branch, as predicted by purely

2

Other joint tests for effects of reciprocity and status quo are reported in Cox, et al. (2009), Cox and Hall
(2010), and Cox, Ostrom, Sadiraj, and Walker (2013).
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consequentialist models of preferences. Alternatively, Player B may have reciprocal
preferences that cause him to base his choices partly on an evaluation of the Player A
choices that would make one side or the other side of the tree relevant for payoffs. A
negatively reciprocal Player B might punish Player A for moving Left, and thereby making
the equal split unavailable, by choosing (9,3) on that side of the tree. A positively
reciprocal Player B might reward Player A for moving Right, and thereby making the equal
split available, by choosing (12,9) on that side of the tree.

FIGURES 1.a and 1.b and 1.c ABOUT HERE

An experiment could be run with a protocol that instantiates the game as described
above. But such an experiment would not be able to elicit the possible behavioral relevance
of endowments that define the status quo ante Player A’s opportunity to act. Neither could
that approach elicit the possible relevance of acts of commission vs. acts of omission that
are defined in relation to those endowments. Such an approach could not elicit the possible
behavioral relevance of differences in responses to such acts because they lead to the same
payoffs. In order to study the behavioral significance of such distinctions we embed the
game form in Figure 1a in two alternative economic contexts that differ in the assignment
of endowments ex ante Player A’s opportunity to act.
3.2 Endowments and Acts of Commission vs. Acts of Omission
Figures 1.b and 1.c have the same ordered pairs of money payoffs at their corresponding
terminal nodes. However, because of the different endowments in the two games, in order
to reach a terminal node with given money payoffs (x, y), Player A and Player B must
choose a different sequence of actions in our two treatments.
In the Give or Pass Game (treatment T15,5 ), shown in Figure 1.b, the first mover
(Player A) has an endowment of 15 dollars and the second mover (Player B) has an
endowment of 5 dollars. These unequal endowments define the status quo ante Player A’s
opportunity to act in this treatment. Player A has two possible moves: she can choose “No
Change from (15,5)”, that is make no change in the unequal endowments, or she can choose
(to) “Give 5” out of her 15 dollar endowment to equalize the now-altered endowments at
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(10,10). If Player A chooses “No Change from (15,5)” then Player B has two possible
choices: he can choose “No Decrease” or he can choose (to) “Decrease by 6” the
endowment of Player A at a cost to himself of 2 dollars. These possible choices in
treatment T15,5 , and the money payoffs they yield, are shown on the left side (or leg) of
Figure 1.b. If Player A decides to Give 5 to Player B then Player B has two possible
choices: she can choose “No Increase” or she can choose (to) “Increase by 2” the
endowment of Player A at a cost to herself of 1 dollar. These possible choices in treatment

T15,5 , and the money payoffs they yield, are shown on the right side (or leg) of Figure 1.b.
In the Take or Pass Game (treatment T10,10 ), shown in Figure 1.c, both Player A and
Player B have 10 dollar endowments. These equal endowments define the status quo ante
Player A’s opportunity to act in this treatment. Player A has two possible moves: she can
choose “No Change from (10,10)”, that is make no change in the equal endowments, or
she can choose (to) “Take 5” out of Player B’s 10 dollar endowment to imbalance the nowaltered endowments at (15,5). If Player A chooses “No Change from (10,10)” then Player
B has two possible choices: she can choose “No Increase” or she can choose (to) “Increase
by 2” the endowment of Player A at a cost to herself of 1 dollar. These possible choices in
treatment T10,10 , and the money payoffs they yield, are shown on the right side (or leg) of
Figure 1.c. If Player A chooses “Take 5” then Player B has two possible choices: he can
choose “No Decrease” in the modified endowments or he can choose (to) “Decrease by 6”
the modified endowment of Player A at a cost to himself of 2 dollars. These possible
choices in treatment T10,10 , and the money payoffs they yield, are shown on the left side (or
leg) of Figure 1.c.
3.3 Implementation as One-Shot Games
In our experiments subjects play a one-shot game. The first mover (Player A) chooses
between No Change and Give 5 or between Take 5 and No Change, depending on the
game. The second mover (Player B) is asked to use the strategy method; hence, without
knowing Player A’s choice, Player B makes a choice conditional on each of Player A’s two
possible choices. Many subjects play the game in the same session. At the end of the
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experiment, pairs of A and B player subjects are formed randomly and their choices
determine payoffs.
4. Implications of Theoretical Models for Play in the Two Treatments
Consequentialist social preferences models (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and
Ockenfels, 2002; the text version of Charness and Rabin, 2002; Cox and Sadiraj, 2007)
imply that play will be the same in the Give or Pass game as in the Take or Pass game
because they have the same end node payoffs. The different consequentialist models may
have different implications about which of the ordered pairs of payoffs at the terminal
nodes will be preferred by Player B. But all of these models represent social preferences
in which an agent’s utility of alternative allocations of material payoffs depends only on
the (absolute and relative) amounts of the payoffs themselves, not on the agents’ actions
that may be necessary to generate the allocations in any particular game. Therefore, all of
these models imply that Player B will make the same choice between two final payoff
allocations, (a,b) or (c,d), in treatment T15,5 as in treatment T10,10 , thus providing a testable
hypothesis for our experimental design.
Hypothesis CP. The distribution of play across the four terminal nodes is the same
in treatments T15,5 and T10,10 .
Any data pattern significantly different from that specified in Hypothesis CP would be
inconsistent with (“reject”) consequentialist social preferences models.
Revealed altruism theory (Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj, 2008) extends neoclassical
preference theory to include reciprocal preferences by adding Axiom R and Axiom S.
Many properties of revealed altruism theory and its parametric special case (Cox,
Friedman, and Gjerstad, 2007) were tested in the two cited papers. The experimental design
in the present paper provides a direct test of the empirical content of Axioms R and S.
Axiom R implies that Player B’s preferences are more (resp. less) altruistic if Player A
moves Right (resp. Left) in either of our treatments because the feasible set {(10,10),
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(12,9)} is more generous (to Player B) than the feasible set {(15,5), (9,3)}.3 Axiom S says
that the effect of Axiom R is stronger when a generous (or ungenerous) act overturns the
status quo than when the same act merely upholds the status quo. Together, Axioms R and
S imply that Player B’s preferences are most altruistic when Player A moves Right in game

T15,5 (a generous act of commission) and least altruistic when Player A moves Left in game
T10,10 (an ungenerous act of commission). Neoclassical preference axioms together with
Axioms R and S imply that more Players B will prefer (“No Decrease”, “Increase by 2”)
for strategy method response in treatment T15,5 than in treatment T10,10 . In this way, the
axioms of revealed altruism theory imply an alternative to Hypothesis CP, which is:
Hypothesis SQ. The frequency of play of nodes with payoffs (15,5) and (12,9) is
greater in treatment T15,5 than in treatment T10,10 .
Any data pattern significantly different from that specified in Hypothesis SQ would be
inconsistent with (“reject”) the empirical implications of the axioms of revealed altruism
theory.
An interesting question is whether data from our treatments can be used to test
psychological game theoretic models. The most likely candidate is the widely-used model
of sequential reciprocity in Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004). Application of the
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (D&K) model to our T15,5 and T10,10 games reveals that any
pattern of Player B behavior would be consistent with that model.4 Hence data from our
treatments cannot be used to test the D&K model. In contrast, the stylized facts about
behavior contained in data from our experiments (reported in section 6) could inform an

3

Cox, Friedman and Sadiraj (2008) defines a partial ordering of feasible sets (More Generous Than) and a
partial ordering of preferences (More Altruistic Than). Axiom R states a relationship between the two
partial orderings. See the cited paper for formal development of the theory.
4

The authors appreciate the generosity of Martin Dufwenberg in engaging in detailed private
communication about the D&K model. A detailed explanation of why any pattern of Player B behavior in
our experiment would be consistent with the D&K model is available from the authors on request. An
extension of our experimental design to include beliefs elicitation could have testable implications for the
D&K model.
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extension of the D&K model in which perceptions of what is “kind” are made dependent
on the (status-quo) endowment of the game.
5. Three Experiments
Out in the field the status quo arises naturally from established property rights. In a
laboratory setting, however, subjects encounter stylized decision problems in which they
often lack clear ex-ante expectations. In our experiments three different design features
are used to induce status quo:
(i)

Initial endowments: subjects start off playing the game with initial money
balances of $15 or $5 in treatments T15,5 and $10 each in treatments T10,10 .
Feasible actions are possible changes in these initial money balances.

(ii)

Labeling of actions: we label actions that do not cause any change in payoffs
as “no change in payoffs” and actions that lead to changes in payoffs as
“give/take x” or “increase/decrease by y”.

(iii)

Entitlements: in Experiment 1 the initial endowments are assigned
randomly. In Experiments 2 and 3 endowments are earned. We use a twoday experimental procedure which has subjects earn their monetary
endowments in a real-effort task on Day 1 of the experiment. Experiment
2 employs a tournament format in which higher endowments are received
for better performance. In Experiment 3 we randomly assign subjects into
different sessions and ask everyone in a given session to attain the same
target performance level. The higher the target level in a session, the higher
the amount earned.

The first two design features complement one another and provide a natural way of
establishing the status quo. By (i) and (ii) the status quo (our treatment variable) is set by
the initial endowments that will subsequently be changed or preserved by Player A via
feasible actions. As for feature (iii), ex ante it is not clear whether the strength of property
rights interacts with the labeling of actions as “give” or “take” and “decrease” or
“increase”. Several previous studies have found a notable effect of earned vs. randomly
assigned endowments on subsequent behavior in dictator games (Cherry, Frykblom, and
Shogren, 2002; Oxoby and Spraggon, 2008), bargaining games (Hoffman, McCabe,
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Shachat, and Smith, 1994; Rutström and Williams, 2000), public good games (Clark, 2002
and Harrison, 2007) and other games involving reciprocal considerations (Danková and
Servátka, 2015). Experiments 2 and 3 therefore serve as robustness checks with respect to
the procedure by which entitlements are induced. Their designs mimic two common labor
market compensation practices, tournaments and absolute performance targets.
In addition we used a two-day format that separates the earnings task from the
strategic play of the game. The intention was to give subjects some time to “bond” with
the earnings so they better perceive them as their own property rather than “house money”
(Thaler and Johnson, 1990; Cárdenas, De Roux, Jaramillo, and Martinez, 2014; Danková
and Servátka, 2015)
We conducted four one-day sessions in Experiment 1, six two-day sessions in
Experiment 2 and five two-day sessions in Experiment 3.

The treatments were

implemented in a between-subjects design. All sessions were run manually using the
strategy method (Selten, 1967; Brandts and Charness, 2011).
Experiment 1 presents a test in which initial endowments (and thus also the roles)
were randomly assigned by the experimenter. In what follows we refer to Experiment 1
treatments as RANDOM T15,5 and RANDOM T10,10 . In treatment RANDOM T15,5 subjects
play Give or Pass Game T15,5 with endowments (15, 5), presented in Figure 1.b and in
treatment RANDOM T10,10 they play Take or Pass Game T10,10 with endowments (10, 10),
presented in Figure 1.c.
In Experiment 2 subjects compete in a tournament which places them in three
different groups based on their relative performance in the quiz. Individuals with better
performance receive higher endowments. The subjects were recruited for a two-day
experiment. On Day 1 of the experiment each participant was asked to answer the same
set of 40 math questions, selected from the GMAT test bank. The quiz score was the
number of questions the subject answered correctly minus 1/4 of a point for each incorrect
answer. After everyone completed the computerized quiz (programmed in Visual Basic),
the final scores were ranked from the highest to the lowest and ties were resolved randomly.
Once the complete ranking of the participants had been determined, the participants who
scored in the top 25% received an IOU certificate for $15, those in the middle 25-75%
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received a $10 certificate, and those in the bottom 25% received a $5 certificate. These
certificates provided the endowments for Day 2 participation. Subjects who earned $15 or
$5 were invited to the same session on Day 2 while subjects who earned $10 were all
invited to a session that started at a different time on Day 2.
The two different Day 2 sessions constituted our experimental treatments
TOURNAMENT T15,5 and TOURNAMENT T10,10 . Day 2 sessions used procedures
identical to Experiment 1 with the only difference that the endowments were earned on
Day 1. In treatment TOURNAMENT T15,5 this implied that the roles were also determined
based on subjects’ performance on Day 1. In treatment TOURNAMENT T10,10 the subjects
were assigned to be either Player A or Player B in a random way.
In Experiment 3 (treatments TARGET T15,5 and TARGET T10,10 ) subjects
performed the same earning task of solving GMAT problems, except that their assignment
to roles was random. On Day 1 of the experiment participants were asked to correctly
answer 10, 20 or 30 problems, depending on which session they were recruited for. There
was no penalty for providing an incorrect answer and no time limit; everyone completed
the earnings task in their session. For reaching one of the three target performance levels
they received an IOU certificate for $5, $10, or $15, respectively. These certificates
provided the endowments for Day 2 participation. The rest of the procedures were identical
to Experiment 2.
All sessions were held in the New Zealand Experimental Economics Laboratory
(NZEEL) at the University of Canterbury. A total of 416 undergraduate subjects
participated in the study. On average, a one-day session lasted about 60 minutes including
the initial instruction period and payment of subjects. A two-day session lasted about 120
minutes. The experimental earnings, denoted in $, were converted into cash at the 3 to 4
exchange rate: $3 (or 3 lab $) equals 4 New Zealand dollars, henceforth NZD. In
Experiment 1 subject payments included a 5 NZD show up fee. In Experiments 2 and 3 the
show up fee was 10 NZD (i.e., 5 NZD for each of the two days), all paid at the end of the
Day 2 session. The payoff protocol was double blind.
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6. Results
As the main focus of the current paper is on a particular aspect of reciprocal behavior, we
begin by first presenting the behavior of B Players in Table 1 and defer the discussion of
A Player’s behavior until the next section.
6.1 Tests for Differences in B Players’ Behavior across the Three Experiments
Recall that B Players’ choices were elicited by the strategy method. Each Player B thus
made two choices, one for each of the two subgames. However, we cannot simply compare
the choice-frequencies at the terminal nodes because use of the strategy method makes the
choice data not independent across nodes within a subgame. Nevertheless, each subject’s
chosen strategy (a pair of choices, one for each subgame) is an independent observation.
Therefore, we first classify the behavior of each subject into one of four possible strategies:
1. No Decrease-No Increase (ND-NI); 2. No Decrease-Increase by 2 (ND-IB2); 3. Decrease
by 6-No Increase (DB6-NI); 4. Decrease by 6-Increase by 2 (DB6-IB2). Then, we run
Fisher’s exact test on the strategies rather than the choices.
To assess the impact of earned endowments on Player B reciprocal responses, we
compare their behavior in the respective treatments using the data presented in Table 1.

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

We begin by testing the impact of endowment protocols in the T15,5 treatments. Fisher’s
exact tests, reported in the first two rows of Table 2 reveal that there are no differences in
B Players’ behavior whether their endowments represent a windfall gain and are randomly
assigned or earned in a tournament or by reaching a target performance (p=0.897 and 0.882,
respectively). Given that, it is not surprising that the (tournament or target) type of earning
procedure does not influence their decisions (p=0.606). A similar pattern emerges for the

T10,10 treatments where the respective p-values are 0.488, 0.500, and 0.520, suggesting that
a random assignment of endowments was sufficient to establish strong enough property
right entitlement effects on subjects’ reciprocal behavior. Moreover, it also provides
evidence that the tournament procedure in Experiment 2 did not incidentally select
different reciprocal types into different treatments based on their GMAT performance.
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TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

6.2 Tests Using Pooled Data
Given that we do not find any differences in B Players’ behavior across the three
experiments, we pool all data and perform tests for the overall effect. Table 3, split into
panels, presents data and statistical tests from individual Experiments 1-3 as well as pooled
data on Player B’s behavior according to the distribution of play. As can be easily seen
from the table, the data are consistent with reciprocity. Our next question is whether the
observed difference in play between the two games is statistically significant. We compare
Player B’s behavior in two ways: (i) for the whole game tree; and (ii) for corresponding
subgames.
As before, we run Fisher’s exact test on the strategies rather than the choices. This
implements the test of the null (Hypothesis CP) that the distribution of play across the four
terminal nodes is the same in treatments T15,5 and T10,10 . The test rejects the null in favor
of Hypothesis SQ with very high significance (p<0.001).

TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

A tougher test of Hypothesis SQ would be to test its implication in each individual
subgame. In particular, for the subgame on the left side of the game tree it implies that the
frequency of “Decrease by 6” will be higher in treatment T10,10 than in T15,5 . The one-sided
Fisher's exact test detects a statistically significant difference between frequencies with
which the Decrease by 6 choice was selected in the two treatments (p=0.011). For the
subgame on the right side the prediction is the frequency of Increase by 2 is higher in
treatment T15,5 than T10,10 . The one-sided Fisher's exact test detects a statistically significant
difference (p<0.001).
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6.3 The Effect of Endowment Allocation Procedures on A Players’ Behavior
We next briefly discuss the differences in A Players’ behavior who show a great sensitivity
to procedures under which the initial endowments were allocated. Table 4 summarizes and
compares their behavior in our three experiments. We observe a significant difference in
A Players’ behavior between the two treatments in all three experiments (p=0.001 for
RANDOM T15,5

vs. RANDOM T10,10 ; p=0.016 for TOURNAMENT T15,5

vs.

TOURNAMENT T10,10 and p=0.09 for TARGET T15,5 vs. TARGET T10,10 ). We also find
a significant difference in frequencies of choosing to Give 5 between RANDOM T15,5
treatment, where the windfall initial endowments were assigned randomly by the
experimenters, and treatments TOURNAMENT T15,5 and TARGET T15,5 where the
endowments were earned (p=0.028 and p=0.004, respectively). The evidence that A
Players were less generous when they had to earn their endowments is in line with previous
findings by Cherry, Frykblom, and Shogren (2002), Oxoby and Spraggon (2008), and
Carlsson, He, and Martinsson (2012). We do not find any differences in A Players’
behavior between TOURNAMENT and TARGET treatments (p=0.614).
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
Comparison of treatment RANDOM T10,10 with TOURNAMENT T10,10 and
TARGET T10,10 reveals that the frequency of Take 5 is higher when the endowments are
assigned randomly than when they are earned (p=0.001 and p=0.028, respectively),
indicating that A Player subjects honor property rights created by performance in the math
quiz. Despite the fact that there appears to be more taking when the endowments were
earned by reaching a target output than in a tournament (50% vs. 34.3%, respectively), the
Fisher’s exact test does not detect a significant difference between TOURNAMENT T10,10
and TARGET T10,10 treatments (p=0.232).
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7. Discussion
We have reported three experiments with two instantiations of a simple two player game.
The respective terminal node payoffs are the same in the Take or Pass Game as in the Give
or Pass Game. But the games begin with different endowments and require different actions
to arrive at the same payoff. The endowment for a game is the status quo ante Player A’s
choice between No Change — an act of omission that preserves the endowment — and
Give or Take — an act of commission that changes the endowment to the profit of one
player and cost to the other. Most importantly, the left-hand subgame in one treatment is
selected by Player A’s selfish act of commission (Take 5) while in the other treatment it is
selected by making No Change in the endowment. Similarly, the right-hand subgame in
one treatment is selected by a generous act of commission (Give 5) while in the other
treatment it is selected by making No Change in the endowment.
Our data analysis mainly focuses on second mover behavior. Does reciprocal
behavior vary in predictable ways in response to acts of commission versus acts of
omission in our experiments? Our answer is “yes”. Data from the experiment provide
support for the importance of discriminating between acts of commission and omission by
a first mover in theoretical modeling of reciprocal behavior.

The data support the

prediction in Hypothesis SQ that in our treatments (see Figure 1): The frequency of
observation of nodes with payoffs (15,5) and (12,9) is greater in treatment T15,5 than in
treatment T10,10 . This pattern of play reflects central features of revealed altruism theory
(Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj, 2008); if we had observed any other pattern of play, the
empirical relevance of that theoretical model would have been called into question. That
model had previously performed well in tests using data from several types of experiments
reported in papers by various researchers.5 But the experiment reported herein is the first

5

The model has previously done well with tests of data obtained from experiments reported in Huck,
Muller, and Normann (2001), Andreoni, Harbaugh, and Vesterlund (2003), Cox (2004), Cox, Friedman,
and Sadiraj (2008), Cox, Ostrom, Walker, et al. (2009), Cox and Hall (2010), and Cox, Ostrom, Sadiraj,
and Walker (2013).
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one designed to stress-test the idiosyncratic implications of the model’s Axioms R and S
that account for Hypothesis SQ.6
The primary difference between Experiment 1 and Experiments 2 and 3 is the
saliency of entitlements to endowments. Based on previous experimental evidence on
earned endowments and behavior, we conjectured that earned endowments could be key
to the intensity of reciprocal reactions towards acts of commission. In everyday life the
money in one’s wallet is in most cases earned and regarded by the owner as being well
deserved. People routinely exchange their time and effort for wages to which they form a
strong sense of ownership or entitlement. In the laboratory, we cannot ask subjects to play
with their own money and therefore entitlements are not easily established. In our
Experiments 2 and 3 we approached this problem by splitting the experiment into two days
and having subjects earn their endowments on Day 1 of the experiment. Not only did the
subjects have to work for the endowments but they also had some time between the earning
part and the game part to develop a sense of ownership of their earnings (Strahilevitz and
Loewenstein, 1998). Earned endowments significantly affected giving and taking by first
movers but to our surprise did not have a significant effect on second movers’ reciprocal
responses.
Our data show that subjects with reciprocal preferences are quite sensitive to acts
of commission, i.e., acts that overturn the status quo. In our experiments we have
developed a procedure that makes the status quo salient rather naturally. It involves an
experimental design with specification of endowments and feasible actions that make acts
of commission, such as giving or taking, stand in contrast with acts of omission, such as
not giving or not taking when there is an opportunity to do so.
One can ask whether this approach would be generally effective for establishing a
status quo in experiments. Experience, habits, customs and norms are likely to play an
important role in some contexts. From this perspective field experimentation might be
another fruitful avenue for future research on the empirical significance of acts of
commission vs. acts of omission. The field has the advantage that both the status quo and
6

There may be other models that are also capable of rationalizing both the data reported herein and the data
from the many experiments included in the papers listed in footnote 5, but that is a question beyond the
scope of the present paper.
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entitlements to endowments arise naturally. However, the complexity and richness of the
field environment might make it difficult for researchers to identify the status quo
conditions that are perceived by participants.
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Table 1. Raw Data on B Players’ Behavior Categorized According to Strategies

Strategies
Treatment
RANDOM T15,5

ND-NI

ND-IB2

DB6-NI

DB6-IB2

16

10

5

2

19

1

13

1

14

13

5

3

20

4

9

2

17

8

7

3

15

4

15

2

47

31

17

8

54

9

37

5

n = 33
RANDOM T10,10
n = 34
TOURNAMENT T15,5
n =35
TOURNAMENT T10,10
n = 35
TARGET T15,5
n =35
TARGET T10,10
n = 36
POOLED DATA T15,5
n =103
POOLED DATA T10,10
n = 105

ND = No Decrease; DB6 = Decrease by 6; NI = No Increase; IB2 = Increase by 2

1
Table 2. Tests for B Players’ Behavior across the Three Experiments

Tests for T15,5 Treatments
RANDOM T15,5 vs. TOURNAMENT T15,5

0.897

RANDOM T15,5 vs. TARGET T15,5

0.882

TOURNAMENT T15,5 vs. TARGET T15,5

0.606

Tests for T10,10 Treatments
RANDOM T10,10 vs. TOURNAMENT T10,10

0.488

RANDOM T10,10 vs. TARGET T10,10

0.500

TOURNAMENT T10,10 vs. TARGET T10,10

0.520

All Fisher’s tests reported in Table 6 are two-sided.

2
Table 3: Player B Behavior

Panel A: Experiment 1
No Decrease

Decrease by 6

No Increase

Increase by 2

RANDOM T15,5

26/33 (78.8%)

7/33 (21.2%)

21/33 (63.6%)

12/33 (36.4%)

RANDOM T10,10

20/34 (58.8%)

14/34 (41.2%)

32/34 (94.1%)

2/34 (5.9%)

Fisher’s Test for
Strategies
Fisher’s Test for
Subgames

0.004a
0.067

0.002

Panel B: Experiment 2
TOURNAMENT T15,5

27/35 (77.1%)

8/35 (22.9%)

19/35 (54.3%)

16/35 (45.7%)

TOURNAMENT T10,10

24/35 (68.6%)

11/35 (31.4%)

29/35 (82.9%)

6/35 (17.1%)

Fisher’s Test
for Strategies
Fisher’s Test for
Subgames

0.061a
0.296

0.01

Panel C: Experiment 3
TARGET T15,5

25/35* (71.4%)

10/35* (28.6%)

25/36 (69.4%)

11/36 (30.6%)

TARGET T10,10

19/36 (52.8%)

17/36 (47.2%)

30/36 (83.3%)

6/36 (16.7%)

Fisher’s Test
for Strategies
Fisher’s Test for
Subgames

0.211a
0.084

0.133

Panel D: Pooled Data on B Players’ Behavior

T15,5
T10,10

78/103*

25/103*

65/104

39/104

(75.7%)

(24.3%)

(62.5%)

(37.5%)

63/105

42/105

91/105

14/105

(60%)

(40%)

(86.7%)

(13.3%)

Fisher’s Test
0.000a
for Strategies
Fisher’s Test for
0.011
0.000
Subgames
a
two-sided test.
* One Player B did not provide an answer on the left side of the game tree.
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Table 4. Comparison of A Players’ Behavior across the Three Experiments

T15,5
Give 5
Experiment 1: RANDOM assignment

21/33 (63.6%)

T10,10
No Change

No Change

from (15,5)

from (10,10)

12/33 (36.4%)

8/34 (23.5%)

RANDOM T15,5 vs. RANDOM T10,10

Take 5
26/34 (76.5%)

0.001

Experiment 2: TOURNAMENT

12/35 (34.3%)

23/35 (65.7%)

23/35 (65.7%)

12/35 (34.3%)

TOURNAMENT T15,5 vs.
0.016
TOURNAMENT T10,10

Experiment 3: TARGET

10/36 (27.7%)

26/36 (72.3 %)

TARGET T15,5 vs. TARGET T10,10

18/36 (50%)

0.09

Tests for T15,5 Treatments (Give 5)
RANDOM T15,5 vs. TOURNAMENT T15,5

0.028

RANDOM T15,5 vs. TARGET T15,5

0.004

TOURNAMENT T15,5 vs. TARGET T15,5

0.614

Tests for T10,10 Treatments (Take 5)
RANDOM T10,10 vs. TOURNAMENT T10,10

0.001

RANDOM T10,10 vs. TARGET T10,10

0.028

TOURNAMENT T10,10 vs. TARGET T10,10

0.232

All Fisher’s tests reported in Table 4 are two-sided.

18/36 (50%)

0
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